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ABSTRACT 
 The current materiel return process for the Navy is to have a broken depot-level 
repairable (DLR) part removed and turned in to the local supply system before requesting 
a new piece of equipment. If the unit fills out the appropriate paperwork with adequate 
justification, the maintainer is able to leave the piece of equipment in its original location 
until its replacement arrives. The current operating procedure forces the maintainers to 
open and close the system twice, which may result in an additional tag-out of the system. 
This research proposes to decrease the steps for maintainers in repairing broken 
equipment by allowing them to automatically leave the DLR within the system until the 
new piece of equipment arrives to reduce redundancy and increase safety when tag-outs 
are required. By implementing this alteration, the Navy could decrease time spent by the 
maintainer, reduce installation errors, and minimize wear and tear on the system. Upon 
completion of this research, the authors identify the costs, benefits, and possible risks 
associated with the implementation of an automatic remain-in-place policy and provide 
their recommendations on how to improve the current process. 
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The first chapter of this project introduces the current system, goals, focus, research 
questions, process, and concludes with a summary of the chapters to follow. The intention 
of the introduction is to inform the reader of what the research of this project covers. 
 CURRENT SYSTEM  
The current materiel return process for the Navy dictates that a broken depot-level 
repairable (DLR) part of advice code 5G must be removed and turned in to the local supply 
system before a replacement can be ordered. The maintenance unit is permitted to leave 
the broken DLR—also known as the carcass—within the system until the replacement 
arrives if the unit obtains a remain-in-place (RIP) chit. A RIP chit is the local supply 
documentation that authorizes maintainers to allow the DLR remain in place until the 
replacement part arrives. The current operating procedure forces maintainers to choose 
between lengthy paperwork required to obtain a RIP chit or a redundant maintenance 
operating procedure. 
Per NAVSUP Systems Command, DLR parts are categorized as “Navy-managed 
items which, based on unit cost, annual demand, difficulty of repair, or other economic 
considerations, have been selected by cognizant inventory managers for special inventory 
control. DLRs must be returned to the designated support point (DSP)/designated overhaul 
point (DOP) when they are beyond capable maintenance (BCM) at the authorized 
maintenance activity for refurbishment” (Naval Supply Systems Command [NAVSUP], 
2015). These pieces of equipment that are denoted as beyond capable repair by the 
shipboard maintainer are known as a not ready for issue (NRFI) carcass (NAVSUP, 2015). 
Per NAVSUP Systems Command, DLRs are identified by “advice codes 5A, 5D, 
5E, 5G, 5S, 5W, 5X, 5R, 5V, 5Y, 52, 53, 54, 56, and 57” (NAVSUP, 2005, p.A1-1). Advice 
codes “provide coded instructions to supply sources when such data is considered essential 
to supply action and entry in narrative form is not feasible”(NAVSUP, 2005, p.A1-1). They 
allow units that are requisitioning items and warehouses to talk to each other without filling 
out a long list of instructions—such as advice code 2L, which allows each side to state, 
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“Quantity reflected in the quantity field exceeds normal demands; however, this is a 
confirmed valid requirement” (NAVSUP, 2005, p. A1-1) without having to write all of that 
out or provide a long explanation. 
There are two types of advice codes: inter-service, assigned by the Department of 
Defense (DOD), and intra-service, assigned by the service concerned (NAVSUP, 2005). 
All 80 of these advice codes are found in Appendix I of NAVSUP Publication 485, Volume 
II (NAVSUP, 2005). The Navy has 31 intra-service advice codes, 5A through 5Z (except 
5I and 5O) and 52 through 59 (NAVSUP, 2005). The focus of this project is on repairs 
assigned with an advice code of 5G. Advice code 5G is an exchange certification for DLRs: 
(1) Requested item is a mandatory turn-in repairable for which an 
unserviceable unit will be turned-in on an exchange basis under the same 
document number as that used in the requisition. 
(2) Requested item is compressed gas for which an empty cylinder will be 
turned-in on an exchange basis. (NAVSUP, 2005, p. A1-6) 
 PROJECT GOALS 
This project analyzes the possible advantages and disadvantages of allowing 
maintainers the authority to leave the carcass of DLR parts with advice code 5G within the 
system without the submission of a RIP chit until the replacement arrives. This policy 
change could decrease the maintainer’s time spent on repairs, reduce installation errors, 
and minimize the wear and tear on the system itself. However, due to the nature of the DLR 
program, this alteration will delay the return of DLR carcasses to be refurbished, thus 
reducing the financial incentives of the DLR program. Therefore, the financial trade-off 
between the reduced rate of advice code 5G parts being returned and the time saved of unit-
level personnel was investigated. 
 PROJECT FOCUS 
The focus of this research is specifically on the implications that the current RIP 
policy has on unit-level maintainers onboard ships in the surface Navy. Although this was 
the focus of the research, the recommendations of the research could be applied with minor 
modifications to the air and subsurface communities listed in the recommendation portion 
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of this project. The authors decided to focus on the implications of the RIP policy on the 
unit level, as other studies have already been conducted upon the larger level organization 
of the Navy—such as a study conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2014, DOD Depot-
Level Reparable Supply Chain Management (Peltz et al., 2014). According to this study, 
“DLR supply chain management appears to be done relatively effectively across the 
services. In particular, there does not appear to be any single process improvement 
opportunity for dramatically reducing inventory requirements” (Peltz et al., 2014, p. 
xxviii). Although Peltz et al. (2014) came to this conclusion for the overall DLR supply 
chain management of the Navy, they did not investigate the specific implications that the 
RIP policy has on the efficiency at the unit level. As a result, the authors investigate the 
ramifications associated with the RIP policy. 
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This project intends to answer the following questions: 
(1) What are the effects of the implementation of an automatic RIP for advice 
codes of 5G within the surface fleet?  
To answer this question, the authors focused on implications relating to money, 
time, manpower, and equipment lifespan. 
(2) What is the threshold/identifier for DLRs to be switched over to another 
advice code if not all 5Gs should be automatic RIP? 
To answer this question, the authors focused on implications relating to money, 
availability, and manpower intensive.  
(3) What areas of policies/instructions need change? 
To answer this question, the authors focused on implications relating to 
clarification, not specified, increased policy, and amount of unity/ similarity between 
commands. 
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 PROJECT PROCESS 
This project follows the general format of the identification of a possible area of 
issue within the surface Navy’s supply of DLR parts. The first step to further distinguish 
this area of study was to discuss with current naval supply officers at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. The discussion took place with supply officers who 
had a total experience covering the surface, subsurface, and air communities. This allowed 
for a better focus area to be developed, which drove the project to the RIP subject. 
The second step was to conduct a literature review, mainly covering the NAVSUP 
Publication 485 (NAVSUP, 2005, 2014) but also including other projects and studies, such 
as the study conducted by the RAND Corporation analyzing the DOD’s DLR Supply Chain 
Management (Peltz et al., 2014). This drove the project even further to specify the type of 
RIP DLR parts to advice code 5G. The literature was referenced throughout the project to 
gain further understanding. 
The third step, data collection method, was conducted through a survey. The survey 
questions were driven by the author’s research questions mentioned in Chapter I, Section 
D and by the literature review. The data was compiled into an Excel spreadsheet for 
statistical study; put into multiple formats, such as graphs; and quantified into mean, 
median, mode, and other relevant statistical methods to discover anything of statistical 
note. Additionally, an open-ended question was put in place to provide nonquantifiable 
data or any other information that the subject matter experts wanted to include. 
The analyzed data was then compared to the literature reviewed to compose the 
analysis. The research questions were then brought back into view to drive the focus of the 
analysis and to answer each question. The answers to the research questions helped the 
authors to form the recommendations of this project.  
This project is broken down into the following chapters: 
Chapter I: Introduction covers the current system in place for advice code 5G 
parts and the RIP system in a higher-level focus; defines the project’s goals, research 
questions, and process; and provides a summary of each chapter. 
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Chapter II: Background covers why the DLR system exists and gives a more 
detailed overview of the processes within it. Chapter II also describes the process of the 
maintainer and supply department on board a ship for an advice coded 5G carcass. 
Chapter III: Literature Review covers the instructions, studies, articles, and other 
literature reviewed and utilized in this project. Furthermore, it identifies the reasoning for 
each use and why it was reviewed. 
Chapter IV: Data Collection Method covers the methods this project utilized to 
collect data, discusses any possible biases and their prevention, and defines the null and 
alternative hypotheses. 
Chapter V: Data Analysis covers the actual data collected and how the data were 
analyzed, utilizing portions from the previous chapters. Chapter V also addresses the steps 
taken to achieve the results, which are also given within the chapter. 
Chapter VI: Recommendations covers the recommendations from this project 
based upon the research questions provided in Chapter I, Section D, incorporating the data 
analysis and literature review from Chapters III and V. Additionally, this chapter provides 
recommendations for further study that were outside the scope of this project. 
Chapter VII: Conclusion covers additional remarks and key points drawn from 
this project and provides a final summary of the project.  
  
6 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The background of the DLR system is separated into four subsections: 
Establishment of the DLR System, Current Process of Depot-Level Repairables, Process 
of the Maintainer, and the Process of the Supply Department. The intention of this chapter 
is to inform the reader why DLR system is vital to the Navy but how its implementation 
leads to redundancy for the maintainers.  
 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DLR SYSTEM 
The DLR process was created as an avenue to combat the ever-increasing cost of 
maintaining ships, aircraft, and a plethora of other capital-intensive Navy technology and 
equipment. Within the DLR process, specific parts are identified as being cheaper to 
refurbish and resupply to the fleet than to replace with new parts. The carcasses of these 
parts, commonly known as not ready for issue (NRFI) parts, are returned either from the 
fleet through the supply system and turned over to the original manufacturer, such as 
Raytheon or General Dynamics, or to depot-level maintenance for repair (Carr & Wilcox, 
2006). Upon completed refurbishment, the DLR is then reissued to the operational fleet as 
a ready for issue (RFI) part. This simplified process can be thought of as a closed loop 
system, depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Basic DLR Chain. Adapted from Carr and Wilcox (2006, p. 2).  
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When discussing the acquisition of DLR parts, the price paid is referred to as 
standard price or net price, depending if the DLR is a new or refurbished item. The price 
paid for a brand-new component straight from the manufacturer, such as Raytheon or 
General Dynamics, is known as the standard price. Meanwhile, the net price is the price 
paid by ships for a refurbished DLR part (Carr & Wilcox, 2006, pp. 2-3). The difference 
between standard price and net price is known as the carcass turn-in credit. With regard to 
carcass turn-in credit, the requisitioner is given carcass value credit so long as the DLR 
returned has the same national stock number (NSN) as the DLR that was originally issued. 
An individual who returns a DLR carcass that does not match the NSN from the issued part 
will be charged the net price of the DLR issued so long as the DLR returned is an authorized 
substitute. This means that if the ship tries to request an upgraded component it may not 
necessarily receive credit (NAVSUP, 2015, p. 8-63). 
 CURRENT PROCESS OF DEPOT-LEVEL REPAIRABLES 
Having covered the basic reasoning for the establishment of the DLR system, the 
authors now focus on the current process for DLR items within the unit level of the surface 
Navy. This process generally proceeds in the following way. A piece of equipment breaks 
and is noticed by a sailor through random discovery, preventive maintenance, or some other 
system indicating failure. The part is viewed to see if it is repairable through the Miniature/
Microminiature Electronics Repair (2M) process onboard (NAVSUP, 2015, pp. 8-61-8-
62). 
The “2M and Module Test and Repair (MTR) program supports testing and repair 
of circuit card assemblies (CCA) and electronic modules (EM) at the Fleet O-level and 
Fleet I-level” (Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA], n.d.). Ships fall into the Fleet O 
(organizational) portion of the 2M system. To become 2M-qualified, sailors go through 
certification granted by NAVSEA following the Certification Manual for Miniature/
Microminiature (2M) Module Test and Repair (MTR) Program (NAVSEA, 2011). Each 
ship is to have a 2M program established, but not all may have the same capabilities due 
to the ship type (Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], 2010). 
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If the part is not able to be repaired through 2M, it is then identified by unit-level 
maintenance personnel by its NSN. This allows the maintainer to identify whether the part 
is a DLR through the cognizance symbol (COG). A COG is a Navy-specific, two-digit 
code with a number followed by a letter used as intra-Navy advice codes. “This field serves 
a dual purpose. An advice code may be entered by the requisitioner to provide coded 
instructions to supply sources when such data is considered essential to supply action. 
When the requisition is processed, a status code is inserted in this field to provide the 
recipient(s) of status with information regarding action taken” (NAVSUP, 2003, p. 32). 
DLR items are listed and identified by NSN, COG, and material control code (E, G, 
H, Q or X), and as such the maintainer and units supply department must follow the DLR 
process when 2M is not able to repair the part within the unit (NAVSUP, 2015, p. 8-61). If 
the part is deemed a DLR, it can then be ordered from the supply system under one of the 
following advice codes: 5A, 5D, 5E, 5G, 5R, 5S, 5X, 5V, 5W, 5Y, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 
or other advice code, which then must be followed by clear text such as “REQUESTED 
ITEM ONLY WILL SUFFICE. DO NOT SUBSTITUTE/INTERCHANGE.” These advice 
codes are required for requisitions of mandatory turn-in DLR items (NAVSUP, 2015, p. 8-
62). If the advice code is 5G, the unit must quickly decide to turn in the carcass (as required 
for a 5G part) or to keep the carcass installed until the replacement is received by completing 
a RIP chit. A part with the advice code of 5G is stated as an exchange certification:  
(1) Requested item is a mandatory turn-in repairable for which an 
unserviceable unit will be turned-in on an exchange basis under the same 
document number as that used in the requisition.  
(2) Requested item is compressed gas for which an empty cylinder will be 
turned-in on an exchange basis. (NAVSUP, 2005, p. A1-6)  
The decision to maintain the item within the system is typically due to the system 
itself being unable to function, or at least to maintain some functionality, without the 
broken part remaining within the system. 
If the unit decides to remove the part immediately, the maintainer will extract the 
DLR carcass and turn it over to the local supply department. Once the supply department 
receives the carcass, they will release the order status off ship for a replacement. Supply 
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will then send the carcass to the local depot to be refurbished or scrapped, depending on 
the extent of damage incurred. In Section C, the ramifications of removing the part 
immediately are discussed in more detail.  
If the unit decides to keep the carcass in place until the replacement arrives, the 
maintenance division is required to write a RIP chit with adequate justification to the 
supply department. This process only occurs for items not already listed by the inventory 
control point (ICP), which establishes a list of automatic RIP DLRs as dictated by OPNAV 
Instruction 4400.9D (CNO, 2017). The paperwork and the actual process on board the ship 
is individualized per ship but follow steps similar to the following:  
1. Member from the DLR carcasses division fills out the paperwork required 
by the supply department for the RIP approval.  
2. Maintainer orders replacement part. (Supply does not release or approve 
part within Relational Supply [RSUPPLY] until RIP approval by the 
Commanding Officer or carcass is turned in.)  
3. Route the RIP chit to the commanding officer (approval between DLR 
carcasses division to the CO varies between ships). 
4. Deliver approved RIP to the supply department. 
5. Supply recodes ordered part to advice code 5S, denominating the RIP 
status within the supply system, including a reasoning for RIP status 
within the system. 
6. Supply system orders replacement part. 
7. Supply receives new part and informs maintainer. 
8. Maintainer removes carcass. 
9. Carcass delivered to supply and exchanged for new part. 
10. New part is installed. 
11. Supply sends carcass off ship to be repaired. 
11 
 PROCESS OF THE MAINTAINER 
The removal of a broken DLR requires varying degrees of effort and time, dependent 
upon the system in which the DLR resides, location within the ship, timing of the degradation, 
cycle the ship is currently in, and where the ship is located. The maintainer’s first job in 
removing the carcass is to identify the effects of its extraction. Will leaving the carcass within 
the system until the new DLR arrives cause more failures down the line, or if the carcass is 
left in place, will the system continue to operate at a lower efficiency? This information is 
gathered from technical publications and from experience by the maintainer, but the ultimate 
decision to keep it within the system will reside with the CO.  
Dependent upon instructions that can be found within technical manuals, the DLR 
may require a tag-out prior to extraction of the carcass. A tag-out is the process in which a 
system or part is isolated from electrical current, liquids, gases, heat, or mechanical 
components, as defined by the Tag-Out User’s Manual (TUM) (NAVSEA, 2016) for the 
safety of personnel while installing, removing, or repairing a system or part. If a tag-out of the 
system is required, the process usually proceeds in four steps (NAVSEA, 2016). Figure 2 
shows the general flow of the tag-out process. 
 
Figure 2. General Tag-Out Process 
1. Determine Specific Tag-Out Requirements 
With the assistance of system diagrams found within the technical manuals and 
diagrams for the system, the maintainer identifies which valves and/or switches must be 
opened, closed, or unplugged to isolate the part from variables that may harm the personnel, 
system, or ship. The amount of isolation is directly correlated with the number of inputs to the 













(200 °F or more), high pressure (1000 psi or greater), sea connected systems (except lines less 
than ½ in nominal pipe size inboard of the backup valves), hull penetrations below the 
maximum anticipated waterline (except mechanical and electrical penetrations designed for 
single closure [e.g., shaft or cable penetrations ]), fluids with flash point below 200°F, oxygen 
level, toxic vapor (e.g., dry cleaning fluid, photo-chemical fluids, and phosphate ester 
hydraulic fluid)—all requiring double barrier protection” (NAVSEA, 2016, pp. G-1-G-4). 
The more isolation, the longer it will take to make the proper arrangement.  
2. Classification of Tags 
The second step is the preparation of the tags by the maintainer, who uses the 
identification to determine the amount of tags, tag-type, and what is written on the tags 
(NAVSEA, 2016, p. 4-8). There are two type of tags: danger and caution. The use of danger 
tags occurs to “prohibit the operation or removal of equipment that could jeopardize safety of 
personnel or endanger equipment, systems, or components. Caution tags provide temporary 
special instruction(s) or indicate that unusual action must be exercised to operate the 
equipment. Caution tags state the specific reason that the tag is installed” (NAVSEA, 2016, 
p. 4-8). 
3. Placement of Tags 
Once the appropriate type of tag is written, the maintainer seeks approval from the 
authorizing officer (or the CO if required by their standing orders). The authorizing officer (or 
CO) reviews the tags, the explanation of how the system is to be isolated, and the diagrams to 
determine whether the isolation plan is adequate with regard to safety and operational 
effectiveness. If the authorizing officer does not believe the isolation plan is adequate, changes 
will be required before proceeding with the tag-out process. Once the tag-out is approved by 
the authorizing officer, serial numbers are issued to each tag to differentiate them. The 
maintainer then displays each tag in the proper location (as specified on the tag), and proceeds 
in turning the valve, pushing the button, or unplugging the system as stated on the tag. After 
closing the system, the maintainer returns to the authorizing officer. An independent 
individual, who did not help with creating the tags, is required to verify that the tags are in the 
proper location and the tag-out was executed properly. The individual tasked with verifying 
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the tag-out process then returns to the authorizing officer with the findings from their 
verification. Each of these individuals—the authorizing officer, the individual completing the 
tag-out, and the individual tasked with verifying the tag-out—signs the tags and the tag-out 
record sheet (TRS) to ensure accountability. Once the system has been correctly tagged out, 
the maintainer is able to extract the carcass from within the system (NAVSEA, 2016, p. 8-
17). 
4. Removal of Tags 
Once the carcass of the DLR is extracted, the maintainer signs within the TRS that the 
maintenance that required the tag-out has been completed. After the maintainer signs the TRS, 
the authorizing officer is required to sign that they confirm the maintenance has been 
completed. Once the authorizing officer and maintainer have signed and completed the steps 
within the TRS, the tags may be removed, and the equipment is turned back into the cleared 
position or condition as indicated in the Clearance Position/Condition on the TRS for each of 
the tags to be removed (NAVSEA, 2016, p. 18-19). Next, the maintainer physically removes 
the tags and returns them to the authorizing officer for proper disposal. “Upon return of the 
TRS and the individual tags, the authorizing officer must verify that the proper tags were 
removed, and documentation of their removal is completed on the TRS” (NAVSEA, 2016, p. 
19). The authorizing officer updates the applicable valve status board(s) and then destroys the 
detached tags (NAVSEA, 2016, p. 19). This tag-out process is required a second time once 
the replacement DLR arrives from the local supply system, going through all the steps shown 
in Figure 2.  
When a tag-out is not required, the part may be removed without any of the above 
steps required in a tag-out. Figure 3 shows the process when a tag-out is not required. 
However, the extraction of the carcass may still require higher-level approval, depending on 
the system affected by the failed DLR. An example of this could be a required approval by 
the CO if the maintenance causes a weapon system to be nonoperational during its 




Figure 3. Carcass Flow Chart 
As previously discussed, the time required in the extraction of a compromised part 
varies based upon the location, the system the DLR is in, and the possibility of a tag-out. 
However, the removal process of a DLR with a 5G advice code could require additional 
time due to the nature of the repair process, causing the maintainer to repeat maintenance 
steps—specifically, the tag-outs.  
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Later chapters discuss the costs and benefits associated with shifting some DLR 
parts with an advice code to automatically remain in their location until a replacement 
arrives.  
 PROCESS OF THE SUPPLY DEPARTMENT 
Once the part has been removed, the next step is for it to be given over to the ship’s 
supply department. The supply department performs several actions required by NAVSUP 
Publication 485 (NAVSUP, 2014), including tracking the DLR parts, processing the 
paperwork, and packaging and delivering or mailing the DLR to a designated overhaul 
point (DOP) or designated support point (DSP; Carr & Wilcox, 2006, p. 9). The supply 
officer specifically creates a local instruction on the turn in of DLR parts (NAVSUP, 2015, 
pp. 1-13-8-69). The general steps for the supply department for a RIP carcass are shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. RIP Supply Department Process 
The first part normally carried out with the receival of the carcass is the approval 
of the newly ordered replacement within RSUPPLY. If the 5G carcass RIP is approved, 
the issuing storekeeper enters the notation “RIP ITEM. TURN-IN NOT REC’D” in data 
block 29 of the DD Form 1348-1A. The skeletonized DD Form 1348-1A or picketing ticket 
is used to order the part within RSUPPLY and is retained in the DLR suspense file while 
awaiting receipt of the RFI item file copies of the issue request for the replacement item. 
“When the requisitioned replacement item is received, the responsible department head or 
work center supervisor is promptly informed of the requirement for turn-in of the replaced 
repairable” (NAVSUP, 2015, pp. 8-63-8-64). The RIP documentation with CO’s approval 

































a copy of the DD Form 1348-1A to the requester, with instructions to return it with the 
departmental turn-in of the NRFI DLR once it has been replaced (NAVSUP, 2015, p. 8-
66). The storekeeper, within RSUPPLY, orders the part under advice code 5S for any RIP 
carcasses (NAVSUP, 2015, p. 8-91). 
Form 1348-1A and any other required forms, dependent on the type of carcass, are 
filled out by hand if the Electronic Retrograde Management System (eRMS) is not 
available. The paperwork is completed in accordance with NAVSUP Publication 485 and 
attached to the carcass packaging, to be shipped upon retrieval of the NRFI carcass in 
accordance with NAVSUP Publication P700: Common Naval Packaging (NAVSUP, 2015, 
pp. 8-71-8-92). The timeframe for this depends upon being a RIP or not and the type of 
activity. For a RIP, the tracking clock does not start until the issue is made. After the issue 
is made, the pending carcass charge—in which the full price is charged—occurs at 365 
days for industrial activities, 120 days for submarines, and 45 days for all other activities. 
The timing stops upon entering a proof of shipment document within the tracking system 
NAVSUP WSS In-Transit Accountability (NITA) or upon receipt of the carcass 
(NAVSUP, 2015, pp. 8-71-8-92). This ends the unit-level supply side of DLR carcass turn-
ins and ordering unless issues arise, such as improper shipment or loss of tracking. Figure 
5 is a graphical illustration of the supply department’s decision tree.  
17 
 
Figure 5. Activity DLR Decision Tree. Source: Carr and Wilcox (2006). 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a review of the literature used to develop and support this 
project. Only the literature applied to this project is discussed in detail; however, the 
sources reviewed went beyond what is covered.  
The investigation began by broadly searching for information relating to the topic, 
and slowly narrowing this information to more specific sources. These specific sources 
were reviewed thoroughly as important information relating to the thesis questions were 
discovered. The initial search began with key sets of words such as:  
• Depot-Level Repairable  
• Remain-in-place  
• Tag-out System  
• Advice Codes Navy  
• USN Ship Maintenance  
After weeks of diligent research, the main sources that were used to support and 
develop this project were the Naval Supply Publication 485 Volumes I (Naval Supply 
Systems Command, 2015) and II (NAVSUP, 2005), Naval Sea Systems’ Tag-Out User’s 
Manual (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2016), and Depot Level Repairable Carcass 
Tracking and the Electronic Retrograde Management System (Carr &Wilcox, 2006). Other 
relative literature reviewed includes: OPNAV Instruction 4400.9d: Depot Level Repairable 
Item Management (CNO, 2017); Certification Manual for Miniature/Microminiature (2m) 
Module Test and Repair (MTR) Program: Organizational, Intermediate, and Depot Level, 
Revision II (NAVSEA, 2011); OPNAV Instruction 4700.7M: Maintenance Policy for 
United States Navy Ships (CNO, 2019); and DOD Depot-Level Reparable Supply Chain 
Management Process Effectiveness and Opportunities for Improvement (Peltz et al., 2014).  
Naval Supply Publication 485 Volume I: Operational Forces Supply Procedures 
establishes the United States Navy’s procedures for all operational forces (Naval Supply 
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Systems Command, 2015). NAVSUP P-485 Volume I covers “organization and 
administration; material identification; material procurement; material receipt, custody, 
and stowage; material expenditure and shipment; inventory management; packaging and 
transportation; special material; financial management; and navy disbursing operations” 
(Naval Supply Systems Command, 2015). Chapter 8, Part D of NAVSUP P-485 Volume I 
describes the procedures and policies for DLR parts, including the description of the types 
of DLRs, how to requisition, and concludes with shipping and ending the process for the 
operational unit (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2015). Chapter 8, Part D of NAVSUP 
P-485 is the most comprehensive resource for identifying the steps a sailor must adhere to, 
with regard to the supply system, on any surface ship. This resource was heavily reviewed 
to identify each step and procedure, to ensure they are written clearly to avoid any 
confusion.  
NAVSUP P-485 Volume II, is the appendices for both Volumes I and III, focuses 
on the advice codes of parts (NAVSUP, 2005). Appendix I listed all official advice codes 
for the Department of Defense organizations and their definitions. The review determined 
if any advice codes required further clarification, anything was missing, and identified 
which advice codes the project needed to concentrate on (NAVSUP, 2005). 
Naval Sea Systems Tag-Out User’s Manual (TUM) establishes the responsibilities, 
training and qualifications, and the procedures of preparing, conducting, and completing 
tag-outs for the Department of the Navy (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2016). This 
project reviewed the TUM for the procedures a sailor must adhere to when a DLR requires 
a tag-out. The purpose in investigating this was to understand the additional time that 
accompanies a tag-out when a DLR designated 5G does not have a RIP status (Naval Sea 
Systems Command, 2016). 
Depot Level Repairable Carcass Tracking and the Electronic Retrograde 
Management System was a project published in 2006 from the Naval Postgraduate School 
(Carr &Wilcox, 2006). Although this project was completed 14 years ago, it holds much 
relevance to the procedures today and established a good starting point for this project. 
Carr and Wilcox (2006) did exceptionally well in breaking down the DLR process and 
included a thorough explanation of the DLR process. Furthermore, their project highlighted 
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many of the issues, before many of the other publications, allowing for a baseline to see 
improvements within the DLR system. Their project, although written as a developed case, 
provided analysis and background information of the DLR system, Advanced Traceability 
and Control (ATAC) system, and the Electronic Retrograde Management System (eRMS) 
at the time (Carr &Wilcox, 2006). 
OPNAV Instruction 4400.9D Depot Level Repairable Item Management provided 
policy and assigned responsibilities for the management of DLRs (CNO, 2017). The 
instruction provided a solid reference point of where NAVSUP P-485 derived its policies 
for DLRs and who set the guidelines. The instruction is mostly a broad stroke in setting the 
policy and is more focused on directing which organizations within the Navy are 
responsible for setting the more detailed policy (CNO, 2017). 
Certification Manual for Miniature/Microminiature (2M) Module Test and Repair 
(MTR) Program: Organizational, Intermediate, and Depot Level Revision II covers, in 
detail, the certification process for the 2M program (NAVSEA, 2011). The instruction was 
reviewed for the purpose of learning more about what it takes for a surface fleet sailor to 
qualify, requalify, lose qualification, and maintain qualification within the 2M program. 
The process for DLRs requires that, if capable by the unit, the carcass must be repaired via 
the 2M program onboard rather than sending all DLRs shoreside for maintenance 
(NAVSEA, 2011).  
OPNAV Instruction 4700.7M Maintenance Policy for United States Navy Ships set 
policies and established responsibilities for planning, executing, and evaluating 
maintenance of U.S. and foreign navy ships (CNO, 2019). This instruction sets a broad set 
of policies, assigning responsibilities to different positions within the Navy to set more 
specific policies where needed. Its instruction clarifies the priorities for the Department of 
the Navy, as well as who sets the more specific policies regarding depot-level maintenance 
(CNO, 2019). 
The RAND Corporation conducted a study in 2014 titled DOD Depot-Level 
Reparable Supply Chain Management Process Effectiveness and Opportunities for 
Improvement, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the DOD’s current supply chain 
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management, with a specific focus on DLR parts (Peltz et al., 2014). It included analysis 
ranging from unit level to DOD-wide in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. However, within 
RAND’s published study, the overwhelming focus was on higher level of management 
effectiveness and seemed lacking on the unit level. This reading established a good 
reference point of how the DLR process operated in 2014. This landmark allowed the 
authors to compare how the DLR process operated in 2006, in Carr and Wilcox’s project, 
and in 2014 with RAND’s study. The addition of the Army and Air Force in this study 
helped to provide other non-Department of the Navy policies that could possibly be 
implemented (Peltz et al., 2014).  
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IV. DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
This chapter includes the methods this project used to collect data, discusses any 
possible biases and their prevention, and defines the null and alternative hypotheses. This 
chapter revolves around the survey that was distributed to sailors stationed onboard a 
cruiser and destroyer stationed in San Diego, CA. 
 SURVEY 
The primary collection of data was based upon the use of surveys issued to 
personnel aboard a destroyer and a cruiser located at Naval Station San Diego, composing 
of 30 sailors in various departments. This survey is shown in Figure 6. The attempt was to 
achieve a minimum sample size of 100 survey responses based off 339,448 active-duty 
personnel within the Department of the Navy (DON), to achieve a low p value leading to 
significance of the statistical test undertaken in this work. Due to the nature of surveying 
individuals within the operational fleet, the response rate was unfortunately much lower 
than the authors would have liked at 30 responses. After speaking closely with the contact 
for disseminating the survey, the authors believe the reasoning for this is due to the high 
tempo of these individuals’ day-to-day lives, and an optional survey was just another task 
for them to complete. The authors also believe that the response rate was lower than 
originally expected due to the limited knowledge base of individuals with regard to DLR 
parts and not having enough exposure with these parts and their maintenance to be able to 
complete the survey.  
A survey was chosen in addition to a thorough review of the policies provided in 
DOD and DON instructions to give a current unit-level survey as of July 2020 to make a 
better comparison between what policy is stating and what units are practicing. The surveys 
were distributed on a volunteer basis and disseminated by division officers onboard their 
respective ships.  
24 
 
Figure 6. Ship Survey 
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With regard to the structure of the survey, no specific part was chosen to gain a 
better average time for all DLRs rather than a specific time based off a single part. As each 
part would require a different amount of time based on part type, location of the part, the 
command’s local policies, number of maintainers available, and skill of those maintainers, 
the average time allows for a more accurate number to use as a base value that the authors 
can set as the mean value for a standard bell curve to draw understanding from and 
ultimately reach a conclusion with reasonable assurance. Although a specific part would 
have enabled a more accurate understanding of the removal time, it would only be accurate 
for the chosen part, and the authors would have had to make more assumptions to fill in 
the quantities for all other DLRs.  
With regard to the second question of the survey, tag-outs were included, as they 
represent a significant step within the removal of DLR carcasses to be returned. The current 
system requires the tag-out procedure to occur a minimum of two times if a RIP status is 
not approved by the CO or the maintainer decides against completing a RIP chit.  
The third question of the survey was included to help understand how the other 
questions of the survey factored into the amount of time it takes to write a RIP chit. The 
authors’ hypothesis is that an individual who responded with high numbers to questions 5-
8 will respond that the amount of time to write a RIP chit is less than an individual who 
responded lower to questions 5-8.  
Similarly, questions 5-8 were included as the authors expected to find an inverse 
relationship with time and experience level. The authors expected to find that a maintainer 
that has worked with a particular part more frequently would have a reduced time for tag-
outs and removal compared to an individual with less experience. The expectation was 
similar for the experience levels of the DLR process and RIP current command process, 
but with less of an impact on time.  
Finally, Question 9 was left open ended to gain insight into any issues questions 1-
8 would not be able to address because of the limited answer choices. The question was 
designed to elicit responses from the subject matter experts on any benefits or issues they 
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have observed with the current RIP process. The question was desired to provide further 
insight that the data and literature review did not show.  
 LIMITATIONS AND BIAS 
One limitation of this survey is that only ships ported in San Diego were used. The 
policies between the various fleets were not radically different in process, with the main 
differences being in the reporting structure. The main limitation with this is that the ships 
themselves, the internal quality of personnel, and the command processes will vary with 
each ship. To counter this limitation, the authors attempted to distribute this survey to 
multiple ships to increase the likelihood of a well-made average. The fleet location is not 
a huge limitation, as within fleets, the ship commands vary depending upon the personnel 
within the organization.  
Another limitation was that the survey was distributed by division officers to their 
sailors. If they did not frame the reasoning for the survey correctly or already held a bias 
toward the system, it could have affected the sailor filling out the survey. The mitigation 
for this was that the authors provided an email that listed the reasons for the survey and 
answered basic questions. Additionally, the survey was completed anonymously to relieve 
any pressure a sailor may have felt if it was conducted with a known participant.  
Other areas that may have disrupted the survey results were those of cognitive 
biases from survey participants and researchers. Participants may have a confirmation bias 
based on seeing the system already in a certain light or wanting to rate themselves higher 
or lower due to their self-esteem. The authors attempted to counter this bias by having a 
larger number of survey participants to create a better standard bell curve. Escalation of 
commitment may have also been present in our research, as the survey was given out to 
multiple ships in different phases of a ship’s life cycle, ranging from dry-dock to post 
advance phase, resulting in different possible pressures of time to complete the survey. To 
prevent this, each participant was given three weeks to respond to relieve any perceived 
pressure, in addition to the survey being voluntary. Finally, anchoring bias could have 
affected the data, mainly in the experience section of the survey, by the participant 
weighing their experience-selected number compared to the first experience question. This 
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was countered again by the distribution of multiple surveys to give a standard bell curve of 
answers.  
A halo effect may also have occurred in some surveys, as a person may draw a 
general or negative perception based on a single instance, creating a desire to skew the 
surveys to their perceived desired results of the project. One counter of the survey was to 
conduct the survey within various commands to offset a command that may have driven 
someone or a collection of individuals to have a negative halo effect, thereby creating 
impartial survey answers.  
The distribution to multiple commands and the use of anonymous completion also 
limited the possibility of group cooperation on the survey, in which one individual might 
fill out the survey for multiple individuals, or in which multiple individuals might take 
the survey together and one person’s answers are affected by another’s. 
 HYPOTHESIS 
This project investigated the removal of the RIP policy for advice coded 5G DLR 
parts to an automatic RIP policy. The null hypothesis would be that the current system has 
no statistical significance between the hours, manpower, or money saved for the proposed 
change and the current policy. The alternative hypothesis would show a statistical 
significance, showing the proposed implementation would have a significant enough 
impact to hours, manpower, or money saved to be reviewed for possible implementation.  
The achievement of a null or alternative hypothesis does not indicate the necessity 
of the addition of policy changes such as a reduction in paperwork, standardization, or 
training. This project utilized the review of the policies and surveys holistically to identify 
these key areas and to determine whether they required any improvement or change. The 
survey provided possible indicators with Questions 5 through 8 specifically. Selections of 
numbers lower than 5 were assumed to be lower than meeting the Navy training standard, 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter further builds on the information included in Chapter IV: Data 
Collection Methods, by analyzing the data that was collected. It is broken down into the 
eight following sections: survey responses, survey questions, general survey results, data 
analysis summary, percentage of total time for questions 1-3, the impact of a RIP, 
experience levels, and times compared to experience.  
 SURVEY RESPONSES 
As discussed in detail in Chapter IV: Data Collection Methods, the authors were 
able to secure only 30 survey responses from sailors onboard a destroyer and cruiser in San 
Diego. Although this is not ideal, the authors believe that the correlations found by 
analyzing the data will remain true; however, the accuracy of the analysis will be broader 
than desired.  
The raw data from the survey responses was transcribed into an Excel document 
that can be found within the Appendix titled Table 2. By closely examining the spreadsheet, 
the reader can identify the specific DLR part the sailor is referencing, along the leftmost 
column, corresponding to the answers selected for Questions 1-8. The following portion 
provides a discussion of the responses to each question and how the authors analyzed the 
responses. 
 SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Within this section, the authors dissect each survey question and reveal the 
responses received, as well as the statistical summary utilized to best represent the 
information received. 
(1) Question #1: How much total time, on average, is required in removing the 
part and closing the system out? 
The responses received from Question 1 rely heavily on the DLR part selected. The 
total time to remove the DLR part and close out the system ranged anywhere from 10 to 
1,200 minutes. In order to analyze the responses for Question 1 most accurately, the authors 
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felt it would be best to use the median time, 145 minutes, for removing and closing out the 
system. The reason for utilizing the median rather than the mean is the mean, 225.89 
minutes, includes outliers within the data set. The “Aegis SWS Pump,” for instance, 
requires 1,200 minutes to remove and close out, whereas the next most time consuming 
DLR part to remove and close out requires 600 minutes. To produce reliable correlations 
and use these correlations to produce well-supported recommendations, the authors believe 
it is best to use the median with respect to Question 1. 
(2) Question #2: How much total time, on average, is required in tagging out? 
Analyzing the responses received from Question 1, the authors quickly noted that 
one of the respondents inserted “N/A” into the section for the time required. The authors 
inferred that the “Electronic Switch” does not require a tag-out when conducting 
maintenance, and as a result listed it as requiring 0 minutes for a tag-out. The authors 
believe it would be most accurate to use the mean within the analysis for Question 2. The 
rationale for using the mean, rather than the mode or median, is the same rationale as 
Question 1, except in this instance the authors believe it is best to include the outlier of 0 
in the analysis. It is an important outlier, as it drastically reduces the “average” time in 
extracting a DLR for refurbishment as a tag-out is not required for this specific DLR. As 
this report analyzes the trade-off between time spent on maintenance and the cost of these 
individuals’ time, it is pertinent to the analysis to include this outlier. 
(3) Questions #3: How much total time, on average, is required in drafting a 
remain-in-place (RIP) chit? 
As the surveys were distributed to sailors with differing levels of knowledge and 
experience, the best measurement to use in analyzing the average time required to draft a 
RIP is the median as again with Question 1 DLRs such as the “Aegis SWS Pump,” created 
outliers. Utilizing the median seems to show a better representation of all individuals 
completing a RIP, regardless of their experience level to show a good approximation of 
how long it would take to complete a typical RIP. Due to these factors, the authors will be 
using the median of 37.5 minutes moving forward with the analysis.  
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(4) Question #4: *Supply Only* How much time, on average, is required in 
inputting the remain in place data into the supply system for a part? 
As denoted by this question, only those individuals in the supply system should 
answer this question. In total, the authors received eight responses to this question with the 
mean, median, and mode within one minute of each other. As a result, the average time for 
inputting the remain-in-place data into the supply system takes 30 minutes. 
(5) Question #5: How much experience on a scale from 1 to 10 do you have 
with this part? 
This question was included to get a clearer understanding of if the responses to 
questions 1-4 were due to the experience of the individual submitting the response. On 
average, the individuals believed that they had a 7/10 level of experience working with the 
DLR that they mentioned. From the responses received, with respect to Question 5, the 
mean, median, and mode were +/- .5 from one another, and as a result, 7/10 is an accurate 
measure of the average experience of maintainers with respect to the stated DLR parts.  
(6) Question #6: How much experience do you have with the depot level 
repairable process? 1 being none, 10 being very experienced. 
The answers to this question allowed for the determination of how much knowledge 
these individuals have regarding the general DLR process for the Navy. The reasoning for 
having both Question 6 and Question 7 was to determine the relationship between an 
individual’s knowledge of the general DLR process and their ship specific DLR policies.  
(7) Question #7: How much experience do you have with your current 
command’s depot level repairable process? 1 being none, 10 being very 
experienced. 
Like Question 6, the necessity of this question in the survey is to provide a 
distinction between an individual sailor’s knowledge of Navy-wide DLR processes with 
their respective ship’s DLR processes. As different departments and different COs have 
differing requirements for the DLR process, this question was included in the study to 
ensure comprehensiveness. 
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(8) Question #8: How much experience do you have with your current 
command’s remain-in-place form? 1 being none, 10 being very 
experienced. 
This question provided the ability to analyze whether one’s experience effected the 
length of time in routing of a RIP and/or the experience level’s effect on other areas of the 
DLR RIP process. The assumption is that sailors with more experience with the RIP 
process should need less time to complete and route the RIP. 
(9) Question #9: Has your organization noted any concerns, benefits, or issues 
with the current remain-in-place policy? 
This question was provided as an open-ended, voluntary question to allow for 
anything the respondents were unable to include in questions 1-8. This question was 
specifically asking for responses that have to do with the entire organization to avoid any 
responses that would be specific to only an individual part.  
 GENERAL SURVEY RESULTS 
Table 1 lists the mean, median, mode, and standard deviation for questions 1-8.  



















Mean  225.892 67.5 78.393 29.375 7.071 7.103 7 6.793 
Median  145 60 37.5 30 7.5 7 8 8 


















 DATA ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
Due to the nature of surveying operational individuals, there were certain 
assumptions that were necessary to make. This section divulges the assumptions that were 
made prior to the analysis of the data received. Data for Questions 1,5,6,7, and 8 had all 
the data filled out for each survey, and time or experience level assumptions were not 
required. 
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• Question #2: How much total time, on average, is required in tagging out? 
All responses of “N/A” regarding Question 2 were assumed as requiring 0 minutes, 
or not requiring a tag-out for maintenance. When producing the analyzed charts, or data 
results, the insertion of 0 was included. However, it is relevant to note that only 1 out of 
the 29 responses for Question 2 had the response of “N/A.”  
• Question #3: How much total time, on average, is required in drafting a 
remain in place (RIP) chit? 
Any survey response that was left blank was populated with 30 minutes. This 
number of minutes was chosen as the previous mode was 30 minutes prior to the change 
of the data producing the analyzed charts and data results. The mode was chosen as the 
authors deemed this the most likely time to have occurred based on the data. This 
manipulation resulted in a change of the mean from 45 minutes to 37.5 minutes change. It 
is relevant to note that only 2 out of the 29 responses received left this question blank. 
• Question #4: *Supply Only* How much time, on average, is required in 
inputting the remain in place data into the supply system for a part? 
As noted in Question 4, this question was only to be completed by individuals in 
the supply department. As a result, 22/30 of the responses inserted “N/A” into this question 
as they are not within the supply department of their ship. The analysis directly related to 
this question took only the data points of the 8/30 responses to this question. This was done 
to ensure a more accurate representation of the RIP process times for Naval Surface Ships 
Supply Departments. 
 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TIME OF QUESTIONS 1-3 
Figure 7 was created by aggregating the times for questions 1-3 from Table 1 and 
then dividing these values by the value corresponding to the cell. The purpose of Figure 7 
is to determine how much the removal of the carcass (Question 1), tag-out (Question 2), 
and the writing of a RIP (Question 3) takes of the total time for the removal of a carcass. 
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Question 4 was not included in Table 2 as the question relates only to supply department 
personnel. 
 
Figure 7. Percentage of Total Time for Questions 1-3 
As shown in Figure 7, survey results indicate that the removal of the carcass 
requires the most time, the tag-out process the second most time, and the writing of a RIP 
the least amount of time. This information allows the project to more accurately determine 
how much weight each part of the process has when moving forward with analysis and 
recommendations. Although the carcass removal is the most time intensive activity of the 
three, it is also the most difficult to reduce as there are many variables that go into the 
removal of a carcass, such as the type of part and location. 
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 IMPACT OF THE RIP 
This section analyzes the time required to replace an advice code of 5G carcass 
under three different maintenance avenues for DLRs. First is the current system when a 
RIP is not completed, the second is the current system when a RIP is completed, and third 
is this project’s proposed system of an automatic RIP status being granted for advice code 
5G DLRs. 
The data analysis in this section used the mean values from Table 1, as the mean 
provides a strong representation of the overall data collected. As each process requires 
removing the part, the time of the NRFI carcass extraction is excluded in the calculations 
for simplification. 
Under the current system, when a RIP is not completed, the maintainer is required 
to complete two full tag-outs, first to extract the carcass, and again after the replacement 
arrives to insert it within the system. In the current system, when a RIP is completed, the 
maintainer is required to complete the RIP process, tag-out the system once, and extract 
and replace the DLR after the replacement arrives. Finally, this project’s proposed system 
would require the maintainer to simply tag-out the system once, remove and replace the 
NRFI DLR simultaneously and without requiring the RIP process. 
The estimated times based on each type’s mean are calculated in the Estimated 
Time Require for DLR Maintenance section. 
1. Estimated Time Required for DLR Maintenance 
Current System with No RIP 
67.5 minutes tag-out × 2 tag-outs = 135.00 minutes 
 
Current System with RIP 
67.5 minutes tag-out + 78.393 minutes RIP = 145.89 minutes 
 
Proposed System 
67.5 minutes tag-out = 67.50 minutes 
 
An analysis of these three options for DLR maintenance reveals that the current 
system with RIP requires the most time to complete, at 145.89 minutes, closely followed 
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by the current system with no RIP, at 135 minutes, and finally, this project’s proposed 
system with 67.5 minutes. This analysis indicates that a change to a new system where 
DLRs with advice code 5G are automatically given RIP status would, on average, reduce 
time spent on maintenance. The difference between each system shows an additional story. 
The difference between the current system with a RIP and the proposed system finds 78.39 
minutes saved. Likewise, the current system with no RIP contrasted with the current system 
with a RIP results in a savings of 10.89 minutes. This lower number is surprising, as the 
paperwork and process are simpler than the requirements of a tag-out. The longer process 
may act as a deterrent to unnecessary RIP statuses, but this does not seem to be purposely 
done when reviewing each policy. 
2. Estimated Cost Differences 
The differing times to complete maintenance calculated in Section 1 can be used to 
analyze cost for each maintenance method. For this project’s purposes, several assumptions 
are made to estimate cost as the individuals conducting the maintenance vary greatly 
depending upon the difficulty, size, and personnel available. For these assumptions, the 
authors assume that a hypothetical DLR replacement requires two E-5’s who have three 
years of service, and work on average 70 hours per week (Seck, 2017). According to the 
2020 pay charts, the base pay for an E-5 with more than two years of service is $2,634 per 
month (United States Congress, 2020). The assumptions of the monthly base pay of $2,634 
and a 70-hour work week, allowed the determination of their cost to the Navy on a per-
minute basis (United States Congress, 2020). 
Further, assuming there are 4.43 weeks in a month (Rapid Table, 2020) and 
multiplying this value by the 70-hour work week, supplies the number of hours worked in 
a month—310.10 hours. Then, converting 310.10 hours to minutes by multiplying this 
value by 60 minutes results in 18,606 minutes worked per month. To achieve the cost per 
minute of an E-5 with more than 2 years of service, 18,606 minutes worked per month was 
divided by the monthly base pay of $2,634 to obtain $0.14 per minute per E-5 with more 
than 2 years of active duty service. 
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Applying this to the time differences from the Estimated Time Required for DLR 
Maintenance section can further assume the cost difference per system by employing the 
assumptions as: 
Current System No RIP/Current System RIP: 
2 E-5s ($0.14) × 10.893 minutes = $3.05 Cost Difference per DLR 
Current System No RIP/Proposed System: 
2 E-5s ($0.14) × 67.5 minutes = $18.90 Cost Difference per DLR 
Current System RIP/Proposed System: 
2 E-5s ($0.14 per minute) × 78.393 minutes = $21.95 Cost Difference per DLR 
 
The difference in cost shows two things: the proposed system saves on average 
more money per DLR then the other two intrinsically, and the RIP process costs the Navy 
an intrinsic average value of $3.05 every time a carcass is given a RIP status rather than 
following the current system. These cost comparisons are only made to be able to do dollar-
for-dollar comparisons, as the DON does not actually pay these differences. The equation 
does not take into account the other benefits and costs of a RIP system, such as the ability 
to use a system even if degraded or the lag in retrieval times for the carcass to be 
refurbished. 
By making another assumption that each ship within the Navy has an average of 
four DLRs to be replaced per day and multiplying this value by the current number of ships 
(290) comes to a total of: 
Current System No RIP/Current System RIP: 
$3.05 Cost Difference/DLR × 4 DLR/Day × 290 ships = $3,538 Cost Difference/Day 
 
Current System No RIP/Proposed System: 
$18.9 Cost Difference/DLR × 4 DLR/Day × 290 ships = $21,924 Cost Difference/Day 
 
Current System with RIP/Proposed System: 
$21.95 Cost Difference/DLR × 4 DLR/Day × 290 ships = $25,462 Cost Difference/
Day 
 
The results in a yearly cost difference are $1,291,370, $8,002,260, and $9,293,630 
respectively. The yearly cost difference can be used to determine whether the man-hours 
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saved are a worthwhile investment. The current system with RIP and the proposed system 
difference of $9,293,630 can dictate that any change in the current policy for advice code 
5Gs and RIP status with the additional information of the financial/readiness costs because 
of DLR delays to the unit should only be implemented if the projected cost is $9,293,630 
or lower a year. Additionally, a review for a change in what advice code 5Gs are considered 
an advice code 5G should be conducted to try to further minimize the yearly cost difference 
of $1,291,370 between the current system with and without a RIP. The review should focus 
on changing the advice code of advice code 5Gs to other more suitable advice codes to 
reduce the amount of carcasses that result in the additional costs of an average $3.05 
additional intrinsic cost per DLR and average of 10.89 minutes of additional manhours per 
DLR caused when the maintainer chooses to gain a RIP status for the carcass.  
3. Inference of the Means  
The next step in the analysis was to discover how far the survey sample data would 
go with a ninety-five percent significance level. The data from the surveys for Questions 2 
and 3 were compared using Microsoft Excels t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means after 
removing any parts with no data responses, as shown in Appendix Table 2. The 
hypothesized values were shown as: 
Ho = Current System Does Not Result in More Time for RIP Carcass 
Ha = Proposed System Results in Less Time for RIP Carcass  
µ1 = Current System Mean Time in Minutes 
µ2 = Proposed System Mean Time in Minutes 
Ho: µ1 -µ2 ≤ Do 
Ha: µ1 -µ2 > Do 
in the case where:  
Do = 0 
Ho: µ1 -µ2 ≤ 0 
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Ha: µ1 -µ2 > 0 
The following criteria was used for the interpretation of the p-values: 
Less than 0.01 there is overwhelming evidence to conclude Ha is true 
Between 0.01 and 0.05 there is strong evidence to conclude Ha is true 
Between 0.05 and 0.10 there is weak evidence to conclude Ha is true 
Greater than 0.10 there is insufficient evidence to conclude Ha is true 
 
First, the hypothesized mean difference was set to zero within the t-Test: Paired 
Two Sample for Means with variable one set as the current system and variable two the 
proposed system. Variable one was considered to be the aggregate time of two tag-outs and 
the RIP for the individual part. The sum of each part was put into a separate column labeled. 
This column was used as the input values within excel for variable one. Variable two was 
the sum of time to conduct one tag-out for the individual part. The tag-out time column 
was the variables entered into excel.  
The results of the hypothesized mean difference of zero for the t-Test using a reject 
Ho at α = .05 level of significance was a one-tailed p-value of 0.000000358. Such a small 
p-value showed that based on the survey data and the criteria, there is overwhelming 
evidence to conclude Ha is true and that Ho is rejected. The meaning of this conclusion is 
that the proposed system is shorter on average than the current system. The shorter time 
means more time freed for the maintainer.  
As the Ho was rejected, next was to determine how many minutes could be saved 
on average and guarantee with reasonable assurance based on the data and rejecting Ho at 
α = .05 level of significance. The same data as variables as used for the hypothesized mean 
difference of zero was used, but random numbers starting with the rounded whole 
difference between µ1 -µ2 was used (150 minutes). The hypothesized mean difference was 
reduced until obtaining a one-tailed p-value just below .05, which was 110 minutes. The 
one-tailed p-value of 0.04627343 for 110 minutes. The meaning of this is that with a 
reasonable guarantee and a reject Ho at α = .05 level of significance the new system should 
on average save up to 110 minutes off the current systems total time for a RIP carcass.  
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The same test was also run for a hypothesized mean difference of 25, 50, and 75 
minutes. The results of the test can be found in the Appendix Figures 27-31 in addition to 
the 0 and 110 hypothesized mean differences. The one-sided p-value results in the same 
order were 0.00000561069, 0.000094699, and 0.001527964.  
 EXPERIENCE LEVELS 
Survey Questions 5-8, which asked the sailors to rank themselves on a scale of 1-
10, with 10 being the highest, were included to analyze the relationships between their 
responses to see if anything could be identified outside the change of policy suggested to 
streamline the process. The data points were put into a scatter plot with two questions per 
chart using Microsoft Excel. The data was then analyzed using a linear trend line and R2 to 
show how much each experience drove the others variance. Each graph was then compared 
to these statistical methods. Figure 8 shows the survey results for each part given for 
Questions 5-8 as a visual comparison of all experience type and part responses. It showed 
that for the most part experience levels in one area were similar to others, meaning someone 
with low experience tended to have low experience in the other three areas of experience.  
 
Figure 8. Experience Levels  
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This analysis generated one strong positive relationship, two moderate positive 
relationships, and three negligible positive relationships. The best way to conceptualize the 
strength of the relationship between these variables is by the linear trend line slope. The 
flatter the slope, the weaker the relationship between the two variables. Aa slope of 1, 
would indicate a wholly positive relationship. The R2 based off the linear trend line 
explains to what extent the variance of one variable explains the variance of the second 
variable (Hayes, 2020). The stronger the R2 in this case the more one experience type’s 
levels variance explains the other experience type’s levels of variance. Within our analysis, 
there were no negative relationships. The slope of the line of best fit and R2 is shown in 
Figures 9 through 14. The R2 value criteria was determined to be: 
Strong: 0.7 < R2 ≤ 1.0 
Moderate: 0.4 < R2 ≤ 0.7 
Weak:  0.2 < R2 ≤ 0.4 
Negligible: 0.0 > R2 ≤ 0.2 
The strongest R2 from the analysis exists in responses to Question 6 and Question 
7 shown in Figure 9. These responses are about the current command DLR experience and 
the Navy-wide DLR experience. The R2 of 0.7149 deduces that a person experienced with 
their current command’s DLR process is likely to be at a similar knowledge level of the 
Navy-wide DLR process and the variance is explained by approximately 70% by the other 
experience level type. This strong positive R2 may also indicate that local command 
instructions and policies seem to be well aligned with the more extensive Navy policies 
making it easier for a sailor to know how the local unit operates.  
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Figure 9. Experience Q6 versus Q7 
Questions 7 and 8, compare current command DLR experience with the current 
command RIP experience. This had a moderate positive relationship between the two 
variables, shown in Figure 10. The reason these responses had a moderate correlation is 
likely due to the writing of a RIP occurs less frequently than DLRs are repaired by a 
department, and the person conducting the RIP process is typically the division officer and 
not the enlisted member. Also, there may be a lack of training or a fading of knowledge 
over time because there are fewer encounters with the RIP process compared to the DLR 
process. 
  
Figure 10. Experience Q7 versus Q8 
Questions 6 and 8, generated another moderate relationship as shown in Figure 11. 
Figure 11 compares Navy DLR experience to the current command RIP experience. When 
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compared to the R2 of Figure 10, the weaker correlation is most likely due to the policies 
being less similar to one another. The typical sailor conducting the process possibly added 
to the weakening. 
  
Figure 11. Experience Q6 versus Q8 
The R2 values that were generated between Question 5, experience with the carcass, 
and the other experience questions showed weak to negligible relationships shown in 
Figures 12- 14. The relatively weak R2 values revealed that the amount of experience an 
individual has with a piece of equipment does not explain any other experience levels in 
general. The reasoning for this might be that a maintainer is not the individual responsible 
for conducting the supply portion of the DLR process. 
  
Figure 12. Experience Q5 versus Q6 
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Figure 13. Experience Q5 versus Q7 
  
Figure 14. Experience Q5 versus Q8  
 TIMES COMPARED TO EXPERIENCE 
Similar to Section G, this section analyzes the possibility if anything outside the 
proposed policy change could streamline the process to reduce time. Any responses within 
the data that were not complete were removed from this section of data analysis. The 
criteria for strength of the relationship remains the same as in Section G.  
Strong: 0.7 < R2 ≤ 1.0 
Moderate: 0.4 < R2 ≤ 0.7 
Weak:  0.2 < R2 ≤ 0.4 
Negligible: 0.0 > R2 ≤ 0.2 
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When comparing the time to remove the carcass, tag-out the system, or the RIP 
with the individual’s experience, there was almost no relationship as shown in Figures 15-
26 within the Appendix. The R2 ranged from 0.00002 to 0.1502, with 8 positive and 4 
negative relationships. This was a surprising revelation, as it was originally assumed that a 
strong relationship exists between tag-out time and an individual’s experience with the 
carcass. The expectation was that individuals who had more experience with a part would 
require less time in tagging out the system as their past experience would speed up the 
process. As found in this project, this was not the case.  
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Within this chapter several proposals are given based upon the research conducted. 
This chapter is divided into policy recommendations, shipboard recommendations, and 
further study recommendations. 
 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first policy recommendation is for the DON to identify a maximum dollar 
amount for DLRs to be considered an automatic RIP. Cost level is based on a comparison 
to the manpower costs, and time costs per average advice code 5G DLR. The assumption 
of opportunity costs between the freeing up of maintenance personnel in time and the 
additional time to receive a replacement part should be included. The policy should 
expressly state a continuation of the expedient delivery of the DLR upon receipt. This 
policy would additionally reduce the manpower issues faced in the fleet today by increasing 
the hours available for other tasks, as shown in Chapter V: Section F: Impact of the RIP, 
that showed a mean of 78.39 minutes of work freed for other tasks when compared to the 
current system with a RIP and tag-out required. 
The second policy recommendation would be for the Navy to institute a standard 
RIP to turn into the supply department. The current process requires each command to 
generate their own documentation for maintainers to allow DLR carcasses to RIP. Creating 
a standard RIP would enable sailors to transfer to a new command and already be familiar 
with the paperwork rather than having to relearn it at each new command. In addition, an 
electronic format for the standard RIP would be ideal for reducing transfer errors and time 
required to complete the request compared to the current system of routing the paperwork 
physically. 
 SHIPBOARD RECOMMENDATIONS  
As for shipboard recommendations, the Navy needs to emphasize the purpose of 
DLRs to operational individuals. The purpose of the DLR system should go beyond the 
Navy’s cost savings and focus on how it affects ships’ combat readiness. Emphasis should 
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be put on the fact that when implemented efficiently, the DLR process should not diminish 
the rate of receiving replacement parts onboard. When presented to maintainers that the 
promptness of their turn-in will directly relate to the timeliness of their receiving of a 
replacement, this should increase the efficiency of the DLR process. This clarification ties 
the DLR process to the individual maintainer and makes its effects feel personal and less 
about the dollar amount they will never see. 
The second recommendation relating to the fleet is the training of division officers 
on the DLR process’s importance and purpose at an earlier stage. While distributing the 
surveys, many of the division officers contacted were hesitant to distribute the surveys to 
sailors on their ship as they had limited understanding of DLRs. The project’s research 
created a better understanding and appreciation for the DLR process’s effectiveness and 
necessity. However, a project should not have to be completed to understand the process. 
Instead, as the DLR process is vital to a ships’ combat effectiveness, it should be taught 
more heavily at Basic Division Officer’s Course. Currently, DLRs are brought up to 
division officers at BDOC, but often glossed over as a topic taught in the fleet. 
 FURTHER STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Further research on this subject should be conducted with a larger sample size to 
ensure fewer sample size errors. If future students were to build on this research additional 
survey questions regarding specific DLR and RIP policies should be added to test the 
respondent’s knowledge level compared to what they record as their experience level. This 
alteration could unveil more particular causes of DLR and RIP issues for surface Naval 
commands. 
A second recommendation for further studies would be an analysis of a cost 
breakdown of DLRs. This analysis would determine if the system of RIP could be broken 
down into categories of high, medium, and low-cost items. The distinction between high, 
medium, and low-cost DLR items could help the Navy supply system better contract and 
determine what should qualify as a DLR. This comparison could determine if the 
adjustment to an automatic RIP for advice code 5Gs outweighs the costs specified in this 
project and at what price level the switch should occur. 
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Lastly, it would be beneficial to have another thesis investigate the trade-offs that 
occur by allowing DLRs to RIP and the cost of the delay to the depot for refurbishment. 
As discussed in detail throughout this thesis, the DLR process relies heavily on individuals 
in the fleet returning DLRs through the supply system promptly. An analysis of this trade-
off was beyond the scope of the project and thus not researched.  
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The Navy’s current materiel return process dictates that a broken DLR part of 
advice code 5G must be removed and turned into the local supply system before a 
replacement can be ordered unless a RIP status is submitted. The maintenance unit is then 
permitted to leave the carcass within the system until the replacement part arrives. This 
current operating procedure forces maintainers to choose between completing lengthy 
paperwork required to obtain a RIP and a redundant maintenance operating procedure. 
This project investigated an alteration of this current procedure to grant advice code 5G 
DLRs automatic RIP status. 
To gain evidence about whether this alteration to the RIP policy would be 
beneficial, the authors distributed surveys to a destroyer and cruiser stationed in San 
Diego, CA. The results of these surveys helped answer some questions and raised new 
questions about the system. The literature review findings revealed a complex problem 
of readiness, costs, and manpower is resolved by comprehensive policies that balance all 
three factors into a mostly straightforward process at the unit level. The only issue is the 
need for a standard paperwork format for maintainers to deliver to supply. 
The data generated by the survey identified that experience levels used in the 
study had a negligible impact on the amount of time it takes to remove a carcass, conduct 
a tag-out, or perform the RIP process. Additionally, the experience level impact of one 
area or another area of experience examined, on the other hand, showed more correlation 
and possible causation. This result indicates that training in one area of skill studied 
should drive better experience within another area of expertise of those studied due to the 
close relationship of tasks. Additionally, experience levels in each area generally 
predicted the experience level in other areas. The experience levels furthermore showed 
training was creating the desired experience level for unit level personnel of about 7 for 
all experience levels surveyed.  
Finally, data indicates that an automatic RIP process for advice code 5G saves an 
average of 78 minutes of work compared to the current system when a tag-out and RIP 
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are required. This benefit, if imposed, would also reduce the workload on supply, saving 
additional time. This project’s main recommendation for the DON is to use this report as 
starting point for future research into identifying whether this benefit, especially in the 
time of more restrictive manning, outweigh the dollar and readiness costs to the DON. 
Questions 1-3, which follow, were outlined in the introduction of this project. 
Now, having completed the project, the authors present their findings. 
(1) What are the effects of the implementation of an automatic RIP for advice 
codes of 5G within the surface fleet?  
As presented in Chapter V: Data Analysis, the cost difference per DLR for 
implementing an automatic RIP status for advice code 5G parts is $21.95. This value is 
derived from the reduction in maintenance of 78 minutes with the automatic RIP status. 
However, the implementation of an automatic RIP status for advice code 5G DLRs will 
reduce the efficiency of the materiel returns process as the depot is receiving NRFI DLRs 
for refurbishment at a reduced rate.  
(2) What is the threshold/identifier for DLRs to be switched over to another 
advice code if not all 5Gs should be automatic RIP? 
Due to the climate surrounding COVID-19, this project was unable to complete 
this additional analysis. Prior to the Department of the Navy making any changes 
regarding the findings of this project, the authors believe it would be best to first have 
another thesis focused solely on this subject. This would allow a comparison between the 
cost savings from reduced maintenance found in this project, and the additional cost 
imposed due to the delayed return of DLRs.  
(3) What areas of policies/instructions need change? 
As discussed in Chapter VI: Recommendations; subsection A, there are two 
policy changes that would benefit the Department of the Navy that were discovered 
within this research. First being the DON identifying a maximum dollar amount for DLRs 
to be considered an automatic RIP. This would allow for a clear distinction between what 
is the higher cost: maintenance, or the delayed return of DLRs for refurbishment. The 
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second policy recommendation is to have standard RIP paperwork across the fleet. It is 
inefficient to have command specific RIP paperwork as it forces sailors who transition 
between ships, to relearn the RIP process. Similarly, this RIP paperwork should be 
completed electronically to reduce errors in transcribing the information. 
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APPENDIX  
Table 2. Raw Survey Data 
Part Name Q1 (Mins) Remove Q2 (Mins) Tag-Out Q3 (Mins) RIP Q4 (Mins) Supply RIP Q5 Exp (Part) Q6 (DLR Exp) Q7 (CMD DLR) Q8 (CMD RIP)
N/A N/A N/A N/A 60 N/A 10 10 10
Aegis SWS Pump 1200 80 360 N/A 7 6 8 9
A/C Chiller 600 45 75 15 4 8 7 6
UPS Battery 440 60 30 N/A 8 3 3 1
400HZ Inverter Module 420 60 60 N/A 9 8 6 6
Rapid Securing Device Past System 390 75 60 N/A 9 7 7 5
GTM FZRE 390 120 120 30 10 10 8 8
RSD 360 60 45 N/A 5 5 1 1
NR 6 Morpac Fuel Valve 300 75 30 30 8 9 8 9
25mm EOS 270 90 30 N/A 7 5 5 4
Solenoid Valve 240 120 120 N/A 5 4 7 7
NR 1 Reefer 240 60 60 N/A 9 5 5 7
NR 3 GTG Canister 180 90 30 20 5 6 5 9
Remote Operator Console 180 90 30 N/A 7 7 9 9
NR 1 A/C 150 75 45 20 9 8 9 9
Tactas Module 140 80 10 N/A 8 7 8 6
MK38 ROC Console 135 60 30 N/A 8 8 7 8
C2Reut Card 1182 120 60 120 30 10 10 8 8
Receiver Light Signal 90 60 240 N/A 3 9 9 9
Tactas Module 90 120 180 N/A 7 6 7 9
NR 1 A/C Hellan Strainer 60 30 60 N/A 4 1 2 1
Left Blank 60 180 300 N/A 6 7 7 8
BFTT CUPS 60 30 30 N/A 7 10 10 10
Shore Power Breakers 45 30 30 30 10 2 2 2
Electronic Switch 45 0 30 N/A 8 10 9 8
VME CCA Per SPS-73(V)12 Radar 30 60 15 N/A 2 10 10 4
AN/SPS-73 SIU CCA 30 30 30 N/A 4 9 9 9
330 Watt Power Supply 30 20 10 N/A 10 9 9 7
330 Watt Power Supply 30 30 15 N/A 9 7 8 8
Deluge Regulation Card 10 45 10 N/A 8 9 9 10
Mean 225.8928571 67.5 78.39285714 29.375 7.071428571 7.103448276 7 6.793103448
Median 145 60 37.5 30 7.5 7 8 8
Mode 30 60 30 30 7 10 8 9  
 
 
Figure 15. Relationship between Questions 1 and 5 
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Figure 16. Relationship between Questions 1 and 6 
 
 
Figure 17. Relationship between Questions 1 and 7 
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Figure 18. Relationship between Questions 1 and 8 
 
Figure 19. Relationship between Questions 2 and 5 
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Figure 20. Relationship between Questions 2 and 5 
 
Figure 21. Relationship between Questions 2 and 7 























































Figure 22. Relationship between Questions 2 and 8 
 
 
Figure 23. Relationship between Questions 3 and 5 
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Figure 24. Relationship between Questions 3 and 6 
 
 
Figure 25. Relationship between Questions 3 and 7 
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Figure 26. Relationship between Questions 3 and 8 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
   
  Current System 
Proposed 
System 
Mean 218.6538462 68.65384615 
Variance 21367.11538 1323.115385 
Observations 26 26 
Pearson Correlation 0.855004985  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 25  
t Stat 6.559042042  
P(T<=t) one-tail 3.58E-07  
t Critical one-tail 1.708140761  
P(T<=t) two-tail 7.16797E-07  
t Critical two-tail 2.059538553   
 







t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
   
  Current System 
Proposed 
System 
Mean 218.6538462 68.65384615 
Variance 21367.11538 1323.115385 
Observations 26 26 
Pearson Correlation 0.855004985  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 25  
df 25  
t Stat 5.465868368  
P(T<=t) one-tail 5.61069E-06  
t Critical one-tail 1.708140761  
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.12214E-05  
t Critical two-tail 2.059538553   
   
 
Figure 28. Hypothesized Mean Difference Results #25 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
   
  Current System 
Proposed 
System 
Mean 218.6538462 68.65384615 
Variance 21367.11538 1323.115385 
Observations 26 26 
Pearson Correlation 0.855004985  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 50  
df 25  
t Stat 4.372694694  
P(T<=t) one-tail 9.4699E-05  
t Critical one-tail 1.708140761  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000189398  
t Critical two-tail 2.059538553   
 
Figure 29. Hypothesized Mean Difference Results #50 
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t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
   
  Current System 
Proposed 
System 
Mean 218.6538462 68.65384615 
Variance 21367.11538 1323.115385 
Observations 26 26 
Pearson Correlation 0.855004985  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 75  
df 25  
t Stat 3.279521021  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001527964  
t Critical one-tail 1.708140761  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.003055929  
t Critical two-tail 2.059538553   
 
Figure 30. Hypothesized Mean Difference Results #75 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
   
  Current System 
Proposed 
System 
Mean 218.6538462 68.65384615 
Variance 21367.11538 1323.115385 
Observations 26 26 
Pearson Correlation 0.855004985  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 110  
df 25  
t Stat 1.749077878  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.04627343  
t Critical one-tail 1.708140761  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.092546861  
t Critical two-tail 2.059538553   
 
Figure 31. Hypothesized Mean Difference Results #110 
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